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On 17 July 2O!4, a Malaysia Airlines Boeing777 that had departed
a few hours before from Amsterdam airport in the Netherlands was
shot down near Donetsk in Ukraine with 298 people on board. None
of them survived the crash. The Dutch government soon called
for an independent investigation into the causes of the crash. The
conditions for such an investigation were highly complex. The cir-
cumstances of the crash indicated criminal intent and rlJmours were
that the plane was shot from the sky. The lnternational Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) stipulates in its Annex 13 that an accident
Wrlev
Abstract
Transboundary crises, incidents, and disasters, such as chemical spills, airplane
crashes, and critical infrastructure breakdowns, involving multiple levels and do-
mains of governance pose a particular set of challenges (Ansell et al, 2010; Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 18, 195; Boin,2019; Journal of Contingencies
and Crisis Management, 27,94; Kuipers & Boin, 2015; European civil security gov-
ernance: Diversity and cooperation in crisis and disaster management, 191, Palgrave
Macmillan). These challenges also pertain to the investigation and learning phase of a
crisis. We study a typical transboundary case: the crash of a Malaysia Airlines Flight
77 (MHt7l, with 298 people on board from a variety of nationalities but the majority
from the Netherlands, that crashed in Ukraine in a conflict zone near the Russian bor-
der. The MH17 case contains valuable lessons on transboundary disaster investiga-
tions. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) took the lead of the international independent
investigation into the causes of the crash. With an international group of stakehold-
ers, the DSB investigated a crash that resulted from a bilateral conflict, requiring the
support from Ukraine's powerful neighbour Russia that meanwhile stood accused
of withholding evidence and supporting Ukrainian separatists. Retrieving evidence
and researching the causality of the crash was no easy task. lf countries wish to fol-
low their ambition to learn from accidents in order to "prevent the past repeated,"
they may more often need to investigate such transboundary cases. This case study
probes into how challenges that are typical to transboundary crises affected the ac-
cident investigation into the MH17 disaster. We search for lessons on transboundary
accident investigation that transcend the boundaries of this single case. Such lessons
may prove invaluable for learning from future accidents.
investigation needs to include the country where the crash took
place (State of Occurrence), the State of Registry of the aircraft, the
State of the Operator of the aircraft (the airline), and the State of the
manufacturer of the aircraft. E
The Netherlands represented none of these states, but the ma-
jority of victims were Dutch citizens. The authorities of Ukraine,
where the plane crashed, soon asked the Dutch Safety Board to
take the lead in the investigation since the Dutch had established
capacity to conduct such an investigation, and the Ukraine gov-
ernment was involved in a violent conflict with Russian separatists.
The lnternational Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) protocols on
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1 incident investigations permit this assignment of lead responsibility'
2 The crash site was in the midst of the war zone. Retrieving evidence
3 and researching the causes of the crash (in parallel with the investi-
4 gation into culpability by the prosecution authorities) would be very
5 diff icult.
6 "From time to time, when major aviation related accidents
7 or tragic events take place, the whole world is shaken" (Klenka,
B 2077:728). The crash was such a worldwide shock because of its
9 implications for global aviation safety; previously taken for granted
10 precautions for deciding on flight routes were suddenly considered
L1 inadequate. After years of stable relations with Russia, the new
12 Crimean war came suddenly very close when an airplane full of tour-
13 ists was suddenly shot from the sky in Europe's backyard (cf' Ter
!4 Haar,2Ot4l. An act of war suddenly came closer to home, to people
15 many audiences could identify with. Apart from the shock, the crisis
1,6 was transboundary in many aspects.
17 Aviation incidents involving international passenger flights are
18 almost by definition transboundary crises in the sense that they in-
1.9 volve multiple national jurisdictions, each with their own rules, regu-
2A lations, interests, and authority: the crash site, the country of air line
27 registration, the victims'countries. Yet, the MH17 case also involved
22 multiple policy domains (safety investigation, criminal prosecution,
23 international diplomacy and foreign affairs, defence and civil protec-
24 tion, aviation security), at multiple levels of governance: international
25 (such as the United Nations assembly and civil aviation organizations
26 such as ICAO, but also civil protection support from the OSCE-
27 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), supranational
28 (EU commission and its European Aviation Safety Agency), national
29 (all the involved nation states around the globe), and local (such as
30 military groups on the ground not represented by a nation state).
31 The crossing of all these institutional boundaries poses a'set ofchalr
32 lenges that will be discussed in this article, with a particular focus on
33 their implications for international incident investigations.
34 Not only the problem and its causes were transboundary, the
35 response and future solutions would transcend multiple boundaries
36 too. "The violent death of so many civilians from different countries
37 over a war zone rendered what was supposed to be a violent act in
38 a local military struggle into a worJdwide media spectacle" (Toal &
39 O'Loughlin, 2018:883). The draftrUnited Nations Security Council
4A Resolution of July 2015 categorized the incident as a threat to in-
41 flternational security (Lemnitzer, 2077:927). ln particular, the MH17
42 disaster exposed an authorlty vacuum to deal with this international
43 threat; it made clear that non-state actors can now posses technol-
44 ogy such as surface-to-air missiles that are insufficiently covered by
45 arms treaties (Ter Haat 2074:459; cf. 6lqer, 2077:7451' Civil avia-
46 tion agreements up to that point insufficiently took into account the
47 threat these weapons pose to civilian aircraft because aviation risk
48 management depends on the voluntary reporting of such threats by
49 [states in conflict (DSB, 2018).
50 Another boundary exists between safety and security as sepa-
51 rate policy domains and networks in civil aviation (Van Asselt,2018)'
52 The locus of safety regulations and risk assessments can be found in
53 international agreements (international rules and obligations on the
operational safety of the aircraft such as personnel licensing and air-
worthiness), but its focus does not include security threats. Policies
and interventions that do focus on aviation security ("safeguarding
civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference"-ICAO conven-
tion of 7944, annex 17) find their locus mostly in airport and pas-
senger screening (Klenka, 2Ot7:7291. Yet, the MH17 incidents show
that some security threats do not originate from uRlawful acts in the
airport or on the plane. Yet while aviation safety regulations focus on
unintentional harm, security threats on the ground are insufficiently
systematically included in risk assessments by airlines (Klenka, 2017;
Van Asselt, 2018; DSB, 2018).
Transboundary crises-affecting multiple systems or jurisdic-
tions simultaneously or in close sequence-typically delegitimize
the authority or operations of multiple policy sectors as they have
no clear problem owner and invoke confusion on the allocation of
responsibility (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010; Boin, 2019; Kuipers &
Boin,2015). Transboundary crises will require an integrated or co-
ordinated respgnse from actors at multiple levels of multiple gov-
ernments and societies. lt also means that accident investigators
will have to collaborate more intensively to investigate disasters in a
complex web of organizations and interests.
lf countrles wish to follow their ambition to learn from accidents
in order to "prevent the past repeated" in the future, a national or
even international focus on accountability and investigation is no
longer sufficient. Though international agreements on investiga-
tions in aviation have existed since the Paris Convention of 1919, the
Havana Convention of 1928, and the Chicago convention of 1944
and the birth of ICAO-a global inter-governmental organization for
aviation safety under the wings of the United Nations-in t947,the
MH-77 crisis shows that authority challenges and gaps continue to
arise, at multiple governance levels, and that such cases require a
transboundary approach, including more than just international
cooperation.
To the Dutch safety board, the MH-17 case was unprecedented
in scope and complexity. The DSB, created in 2005, is the only
accident investigation authority in the Netherlands. ln the past
five years (2073-2078), it published on average seven investi-
gation reports per year. lts independent accident investigations
focus on analysing the causes of large-scale incidents or reoccur-
ring safety risks (range of small incidents). ln various sectors of
transportation, national and international protocols oblige states
to investigate accidents in order to learn how to improve safety.
Many states have created sectoral accident investigation bodies,
such as for rail or maritime accidents. The Dutch Safety Board con-
centrates all accident investigation authority in the Netherlands in
one single board, with a broad scope and strong legal mandate. lts
three crown-appointed members share the final responsibility for
all DSB investigations. The organization counts approximately 70
staff members and occasionally hires external expertise for spe-
cific investigations.
This case study will probe into the challenges that are typical
to transboundary crises and how these challenges affected the inci-
dent investigation after the MH17 disaster. With a team of authors





















































representing both theoretical and practical expertise, we search
for lessons on transboundary accident investigation that transcend
beyond the boundaries of this single case. Such lessons (both best
practices and pitfalls to be avoided in the future) may prove invalu-
able for learning from future accidents.
The team of authors and researchers consists of three people:
(a) a former crown-appointed vice chairman of the Dutch Safety
Board (Muller), who was co-leading the international investigation
on MH-17; (b) a former senior research manager of the DSB, who
was in charge of the coordination and running of the investigation
(Verolme); and (c) a scholar with broad expertise on crisis gover-
nance who has been studying the case from a scholarly perspective
(Kuipers). Two of the three authors were thus participant-observ-
ers to the transboundary investigation process. The article does not
so much report on the specific findings regarding the MH-17 case,
but on the implications for transboundary crises. We aim to learn
about transboundary accident investigations by drawing on the in-
depth experience with a particular case that in our view exemplifies
a transboundary crisis.
2 TRANSBOUNDARY CRISES IN THEORY
Though transboundary causes and effects of crises abound in
practice, a review of three crisis and disaster journals of the past
thirty years indicates that transboundary crises and their chal-
lenges received only limited attention in the literature (Boin,2019;
Kuipers & Welsh, 20771. A notable exception is the work of Ansell
et al. (2010) that outlines the main challenges that transbound-
ary crises pose for the crisis response, followed up by a number
of conceptual discussions by Boin (2OO9,2079lr. We here employ
the Ansell et al. (2010) framework to take stock of lessons learned
in transboundary crisis investigation. The framework will serve to
place the lessons learned during the MH17 crisis in the context of
these particular challenges.
Transboundary crises often do hot peitain to a single event,
but "rather a concatenation of related events" (Ansell et al.,
2070:7971. Those events can often only be related with some kind
of precision in hindsight. The fragmentation of causal compo-
nents implies that transboundary crises often have no epicentre
or that the causes are lbcated far from the consequences. Effects
are fragmented too: these crises typically escalate in unforeseen
directions, explolting linkages between functional and geograph-
ical domains. This is no new trait to crises and disasters (think of
the factors and consequences involved in the bubonic Plague, the
great Recession or the collapse of the lncan empire). However,
"modern vectors such as globalization, optimization of supply
chains, lncreased mobility, tight coupling, and complex interaction
of technically advanced systems have increased systemic efficien-
cies that exacerbate the speed and scope of contagion" (Kuipers &
Boin, 2Ot5:793; Turner, 1978; Perrow, 1984). Therefore, familiar
hazards (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes) produce unanticipated
risks (Boin, 2009). National and functional policy domains are
often ill-equipped to deal with transboundary causes and effects
in a coordinated fashion.
Transboundary crisis managers face, according to Ansell et al.
(2010), typical political-administrative constraints aggravated by
the situation's transboundary nature: (a) coping with uncertainty;
(b) providing surge capacity (personnel, expertise, resources) and
coordinating a response; and (c) communicatiJrg with the public
(2O7O:197-2OO). These constraints are present in any type of crisis,
but they are aggravated by interdependence among organizational
actors involved in the transboundary variety, .
lnterdependent linkages between actions and actors can unin-
tendedly affect the collective outcome of the crisis responses. Ansell
et al. (2010) instruct us to look at Thomspon's (1967) classic distinc-[
tion between pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence,
because precisely these linkages become more noticeable and
problematic in situations where multiple actors and jurisdictions are
simultaneously involved. The fact that a crisis affects multiple geo-
graphical jurisdictions at the same time implies pooled interdepen-
dence: a unilateral response to the same crisis is required by multiple
actors at once-such as fighting a pandemic worldwide, probably
requesting the same resources-such as vaccines-that acutely be-
come scarce..The cross-sectoral nature of the crisis affects actors in
differbnt policy domains in often sequentiolly interdependent ways:
the response in one domain defines the problem in an adjacent pol-
icy domain. The cascading effects of a blackout or cyber crisis come
to mind. Most complex is perhaps the reciprocal interdependence,
which necessitates a joint, coordinated response because each indi-
vidual actor depends on input from other actors to make a move. The
stalemate in European aviation produced by a volcanic ash cloud in
2010, when none of the countries dared to be the first to resume fly-
ing in their national airspace and defy the unknown risks and precau-
tionary international "no-fly" rules illustrates this dynamic (Kuipers
& Boin,20!5:197).
The next sections show how the sudden interdependencies that
arise from the involvement of multiple levels, interests, and domains
in transboundary situations complicate each of the regular crisis
challenges:
o coping with uncertainty;
. coordination of the response (in this case the investigation);
r and communicating about the crisis.
These interdependencies have specific implications for the acci-
dent investigation case explored here. The Lessons Learned section
subsequently provides insights from the MH-17 disaster investiga-
tion on exactly these implications,
2.1 | Coping with uncertainty in
transboundary crises
For disaster investigation, access to information and other sources
for forensic evidence is pivotal. Yet, coping with uncertainty






























implies that officials depend on information held by other ac-
tors. The uncertainty in a transboundary crisis deepens because
information is typically not shared among actors across func-
tional domains or jurisdictions (for instance medical actors cannot
share information that violates their principles of confidentiality,
whereas other organizations may need this information to avoid
or mitigate risks in recruiting, staffing, regulating, rehabilitating,
etc). lt can also be that security-inspired secrecy between states
or organizations prevents them from exchanging information the
other actor needs. Also different organizations in different policy
domains have their own interests, methods, vocabulary, and sets
of procedures. This may lead to unintended mismatches and ill-
timed exchanges of information that is not properly interpreted or
acted upon by other actors.
lnternational agreements on accident investigation emphasize
the overriding importance of learning over sanctioning. This is why
for instance retrieval of an airplane's black box serves learning pur-
poses above prosecution objectives. Accident investigations thus
build on the premise of information disclosure. The transboundary
character of incidents and accidents is likely to be a complicating
factor in effectively investigating its causes, because the limits of
the mandate of the investigator (only for a specified jurisdiction,
sector, or professional discipline) meet the multiple perspectives of
the key actors involved. This complexity most likely increases with
international cases.
priorities. This problem can become particularly acute among public[
private entities" (ibid, p. !991. For instance, during the volcanic ash
crisis, airlines were desperate to resume flying, whereas manufac-
turers had no interest in assuming liabilities by providing the little in-
formation they had available on how modern aircraft engines would
react to ash particles (Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 2013). Meanwhile,@
national governments did not have a sound juridical basis for author-
itative coordinated decision-making on aviation safety (Alemanno,
2011; O'Regan,2011).
With any large-scale crisis or accident, different regulators, judi-
cial authorities, forensic investigators, and politically commissioned
inquirers may have an interest or obligation to examine the case and
its causes. Within a national legal framework difficulties abound to
coordinate and align their efforts so that each of these actors can do
their job without obstructing the work of others. The challenge for
a transnational disaster investigation such as on MH17 are likely to
exacerbate with the number of nations involved. Crucial in investiga-
tions of transboundary crises is therefore the need for cooperation
between different countries with completely different legalities,
rules, and laws.
2.3 I Communicating about transboundary crises
Crises can be seen as sudden collapses of a pre-existing social order.
Crises in the sense of major accidents and incidents are often poten-
tially foreseeable and avoidable, but at the same time they are char-
acterized as negative surprises with highly disruptive consequences
(Boin et al,2Ot7; Roux-Dufort, 2007; Topper and Lagadec, 2013).8@E
Their occurrence provokes a cultural reassessment of precautions
regarding risk governance in a specific domain. ln Barry Turner's fa-@
mous words: they mark a "collapse of precautions that had hithero
been regarded culturally as adequate" (1976:380). Precautions such
as risk assessment practices regarding flying over conflict zones
come to mind. One of the most important parts of strategic com-
munication on crises is to provide a "meaning making" account on
what is going on (Boin et al 20!71. Public leaders need to define afi
situation in such an authoritative way that it (a) channels emotions
and influences citizen behaviour in a desired direction such as "fear
and impact management" in response to terrorist attacks (Bakker &
De Graaf, 2O7a):b) legitimizes proposed actions (Reyes,2O11); or (c)
explains how a crisis could occur (in order to restore the legitimacy
of the status quo) (Boin, 't Hart, & McConnell, 2009).
Transboundary crises multiply the number of potential alterna-
tive causal accounts on a given situation and the number of possibly
advocated alternative explanations. Even unilaterally, "getting it [a
coherent picture of the situationl out to the public in the form of
accurate, clear, and actionable information requires a major public
relations effort" (Ansell et al., 2010:200). The increasing number of
involved actors from a diversity of domains makes it harder if not im-
possible to produce one clear and coherent message. The dynamics
of transboundary crises in terms of sequential and reciprocal inter-
dependencies result in multiple sources of information at different
2.2 | Coordination challenges in
transboundary crises
31 A second challenge arises from the combined interdependerlcies in
32 terms of organizational cooperation and coordination. A substantial
33 increase in resources is suddenly necessary to meet the demands to
34 investigate the crisis at hand. ln particular, those resources that are
35 expensive to maintain in "peace time," such as'speclfic laboratory
36 facilities or forensic expertise, cannot be shared among nations dur-
37 ing crisis because of a simultaneous peak in demand. ln the words
38 of Ansell et al: "the ability to plan for resources from elsewhere in a
39 larger network of [...] actors is eroded by the transboundary nature
40 of the crisis" (2010:198).
4t When interdependence is not pooled but rather sequential or
42 reciprocal, the challenge pertains to the coordination of separate
43 actors and their individual responses to counter a threat or alleviate
44 the consequences. This challenge requires an orchestrated coopera-
45 tive effort that may even go against the primary individual interests
46 of some or all of the actors involved. For instance, "ownership" or co-
47 ordination of the crisis response may become an avoided responsi-
48 bility among the actors involved or-by contrast-a status claimed by
49 Edifferent actors (Ansell et al., 2O7O:799; cf. Kuipers & Welsh, 2017).
50 Another coordination challenge would be "inter-sectoral coor-
51. dination"; "although institutions representing different functional
52 domains may not be "sovereign" in the same sense that territorial
53 jurisdictions are, they often differ significantly in their logics and





















































points in time that are not always anticipated by all actors involved
(ibid, p.200).
Transboundary aviation disasters, such as the MH17 case, or
the disappearance of flight MH370 in 2014, Egyptair flight 990
plummeting into the ocean in 1999, or the explosion of TWA800
in 7996, can give rise to an increase of perspectives and multiplic-
ity of accounts of the case at hand.. Conspiracy stories that arise
can complicate the investigation. Competing perspectives do not
only bring multiple contradicting sources and multiple biases to
the investigation table but also additional challenges in communi-
cating uniformly about the investigation findings. Formal investi-
gation and governmental agencies need to find a way to agree on
what to communicate and how to speak authoritatively about the
investigation.
The next sections will first outline considerations on method-
ology and data collection, and subsequently analyse the lessons
of investigating the crash of flight MH17 along the lines presented
above. The international and interdisciplinary dimensions of this
transboundary crisis are likely to exacerbate challenges regarding
uncertainty, inter-organizational coordination, and reliable and ef-
fective communication.
3 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This paper details how the transboundary character of this particular
crisis impacted the accident investigation, and how the key actors
from the Dutch Safety Board dealt with it. The data for this study
are derived from multiple sources. Firstly, participant observation is
a primary source of information for this study. The main lessons on
MH-17 by the Dutch Safety Board have been gathered by two of its
key players within the particular investigation project. Erwin Muller
was co-leading the MH17 investigation as one of the three crown-
appointed members of the Dutch Safety Board. Ellen Verolme was
the responsible senior investigation manager of the Board conduct-
ing and coordinating the investigation efforts. Their involvement
provided full access and overview of the events and responses as
they unfolded. They (co-authors of this article) have consulted col-
leagues in an interview round before drafting a short list of lessons
learned which we subsequently categorized along the lines of the
three main challenges, An additional check on exhaustiveness and
representativeness of the lessons has been performed by review-
ing previous drafts of this account by a different colleague from the
DSB. The insights from all persons involved are personal observa-
tions and not official standpoints from the authorities involved.
The second source of information is the official, extensive report
published by the.Dutch Safety Board to account for its investigation
and for the steps it took in the process. The complete report has
been published both in Dutch and in English and it is publicly avail-
able online through the DSB website (DSB, 2015). All claims in this
paper have been checked against the content of this official report
and wherever possible backed up f urther with more detail, evidence,
and references from the report.
The third source of information consists of secondary sources
such as other studies on the MH-17 disaster from a legal perspective
(De Hoon, 2017; Kwarteng & Botchway, 2018; 6leer, 2ot7;fer Haar,
2OI4), an aviation security perspective (Abeyratne, 2014; Klenka,@
2Ot7; Yan Asselt, 2018), or an international relations perspective
(Toal & O'Loughlin, 2018). These studies have been used to further
test the validity of particular claims or lessons, and to add more de-
tail or insights on particular lessons.
As in other case studies, it is impossible to both have access
to the full experience, overview, and details of the event or pro-
longed situation and meanwhile completely rule out bias towards
or interest in the account thbreof (cf. Useem et al,2O77l. We aim@
to offer a reasonable set of safeguards notwithstanding, drawing
on exceptionally strong and insightful sources, while vigilantly
triangulating for validity 0f claims and self-consciously guarding
against bias.
4 | LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE MH17
DISASTER I NVESTIGATIO N
4,7 I Uncertainty on all fronts in a geopolitical
setting
The dependence on information provided by others played a
major role in the MH17 crisis. lnstead of against the backdrop of
a government that functions reliably and responsibly, the crash of
MH17 took place in a war zone, in the middle of a conf lict between
two nations (Ukraine and Russia) and a range of rebel groups, with
constant shifts between different realities. The crash site was at
various points in time in the hands of different parties in a war.
Agreements with one group one day would not be valid the next
day when another warlord had taken over. For authorities from
democratic states, striking agreements with such groups in con-
f lict, or allowing payments even for practical issues such as hiring
a truck, is highly questionable if it thereby would imply recognizing
the local authority of such a group. The context and framework in
which the MH17 investigation took place was changing continu-
ously. When fake news abounded, and verification on the ground
was difficult or impossible, potentially new realities waxed and
waned continuously. The unstable and insecure context impeded
the collection of data in general and the access to the crash site
in particular. Not only was the crash site inaccessible to forensic
experts, it could also not be sealed off to others.
To the foreign investigators and the governments involved, it
was often unclear who was in charge of what, with which represen-
tatives appointments could be made and how long these arrange-
ments would be in place. This limited reliability of arrangements,
and the constantly changing situation, required interventions on
all levels, with all parties, both official and behind the scenes. This
made the DSB's work contingent upon cooperation of key players.
Consequently, having the facts correct in the investigation was not
the only thing that counted, as the support from the right actors was
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1 equally important. For this purpose, the DSB used a special envoy
2 (a former diplomat) to stimulate cooperation on the highest admin-
3 istrative levels. The existing regulation for international aviation in-
4 vestigations had not taken into account such an incident in which
5 the regular forms of accident investigation were not possible. For the
6 DSB, this meant constant improvisation and further interpretation of
7 the existing rules.
B During the investigation process, the involvement of so many
9 different actors with competing interest regarding the outcome of
10 th€ investigation also gave rise to additional uncertainty. The legit-
I imacy of the investigation and the acceptance of the lead role of
12 the Dutch Safety Board wasnofaitaccompli beforehand and proved
13 a constant factor to be dealt with. The independence of the acci-
t4 dent investigation, and the fact that this was performed by a country
15 other than the country in which the accident took place (the "state
16 of occurrence," in this case Ukraine, is according to international avi-
17 ation agreements primarily responsible for performing the accident
18 investigation), was continuously questioned. One way of dealing
1,9 with potential controversy around the investigation was the use of
20 the standard ICAO accident investigation framework prescribed by
27 Annex 13 of the Chicago Agreement. This Annex provides a "cook-
22 book" for air crash investigation that has been developed interna-
23 tionally under the umbrella of the UN. The Annex has subsequently
24 been ratified by all partner nations. By using this standardized ap-
25 proach, questions regarding the approach that was followed during
26 the investigation and aspects such as the thoroughness of the inves-
27 tigation were covered almost "automatically."
28 ln addition, the DSB used its authority based on the KingdomAct
29 Dutch Safety Board which allows in the Netherlands to request data,
30 cooperation, and access beyond the ICAO mandate. Sometimes it
31 broadened the scope ofits investigation (such as to answer questions
32 by relatives to find out about the consequences for the occupants of
33 the plane during the crash) and it would do explicitly so on the basis
34 of the authority provided by the Kingdom Act Dutch Safety Board
35 (DSB, 2015:16-17). Though this Act does not apply internationally,
36 it gave the DSB legitimacy in its requests for additional information
37 and many actors responded positively to such requests. The leading
38 Dutch role in retrieving evidence, remains, and possessions from the
39 crash site was backed by a bilateral agreement between the gov-
40 ernments of the Netherlands and Ukraine, ratified on 28 July 2014.
4t The agreement aimed "to facilitate the recovery of remains and the
42 conduct of the investigatlon called for in United Nations Security
43 Council Resolution 2,766 of 2l July 2074, and other activities as
44 may be agreed between the Parties." (see Agreement between the
45 Kingdom of the Netherlands & Ukraine, 2015, article 1.1; Torenvlied,
46 Giebels, Wessel, Gutteling, & Broekema, 2075:2021.
47 Yet in spite of legal backing, in the words of one of the DSB
48 members: "Any role ambiguity or even role expansion [of the in-
49 vestigatorsl could have been detrimental to the whole endeavour.
50 ln order to be able to carry out the investigation, we needed com-
51 mon ground among the involved accident investigators from the
52 various countries participating in the investigation, which required
53 that we strictly adhered to the international agreements as well as
international and national regulations and that we were able to de-
fend all our choices with references to those frameworks. We also
realized that any trespassing would be cast in political terms, so role
clarity was also critical in view of our task to ca rry out anindependent
investigation" (Van Asselt, 2078:594, emphasis in original).
lnternational institutions-actors that themselves represent
a multitude of possibly conflicting interests-sueh as the United
Nations followed this investigation closely (Lemnitzei, 2017). The
international attention is exceptional for an organization such as
the DSB which is a national body that predominantly investigates
national issues. The geopolitical dimension increased the impor-
tance of this independent investigation. Different countries brought
different viewpoints to the investigation table (Toal & O'Loughlin,
2018). The high stakes and multiple perspectives increased the im-
portance to ascertain eveiy bit of evidence in as many ways as pos-
sible. The vital importance of ascertaining all evidence three times
over stood in stark contrast to the availability of trustworthy and
verifiable information.
Therefore, external reviews were also invited as part of the in-
vestigation process. The DSB initially conducted a stakeholder anal-
ysis on the case to ensure it would be aware of different interests
and perspeciives during the investigation. Reflection meetings were
organized, for which the DSB invited external experts to advise and
review the investigation process so far and its preliminary findings.
The meetings explicitly aimed to explore how the DSB could ensure
that its investigation would match the expectations of the outside
world (DSB,2015:18).
4.2 I Transboundary coordination
Providing surge capacity was a prominent issue from the start for
the DSB, as the MH17 investigation weighed so heavily on the DSB's
internally available resources to collect and analyse information.
Approximately 72 members of the DSB staff were at some point in-
volved in the activities in support of this single investigation (DSB,
2075:221. This number exceeds the total number of staff members
that normally works for the DSB on multiple investigations simulta-
neously. Only a handful employees worked on other investigation
projects, most of which were postponed. ln a "normal" year, the
DSB conducts five to six investigations simultaneously, and after the
summer of 2014 the organization focused on only one all-consuming
project. The investigation also demanded an unprecedented pro-
curement and coordination of external expertise. The number of ex-
ternal experts that were contracted by the DSB eventually doubled
and then even nearly tripled the organization in size, at the peak of
its activities. One of the DSB staff members described the situation
as similar to an organizational "infarct."
Coordinating activities to get the job done on the scene was an-
other issue. One of the most pressing problems from the very onset
of the investigation was access to the crash site to retrieve bodies,
materials, and forensic evidence. Operating in a war zone is clearly
outside the comfort zone of accident investigators. The conflict
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1 evolved rapidly in the weeks before and after the incident and at-
2 tempts to arrange a ceasefire to perform (forensic) investigation
3 at the crime scene proved to be very difficult. The priorities of the
4 Dutch government to recover the bodies of the victims as soon as
5 possible implied that other investigative activities such as the recov-
6 ery of debris and investigations into the probable cause on the crash
7 site had to be postponed to a later stage.l This was an important
B setback to the investigation, which is usually largely dependent on
9 the collection of onsite materials. lt meant that investigative activi-
10 ties such as the analysis of digital evidence played a relatively more
LI important role than in other investigations. During the investigation,
1,2 it turned out that for instance pictures taken on site by Ukrainian
13 and Malaysian investigators immediately after the crash proved to
74 be invaluable in the months thereafter. When the accident site was
t5 temporarily inaccessible, reconstruction, and verification of aircraft
1-6 parts depended heavily on these initial photographs to continue the
L7 progress ofthe investigation.
1B Concentration with the criminal investigation plays a role in
79 almost any accident investigation case. ln the Netherlands, legis-
20 lation clearly demarcates the responsibilities and mandate of the
2I DSB vis-i-vis the work of the prosecution office. The Dutch law
22 on the DSB includes explicit provisions that "give the DSB exces-
23 sive authority to request data and information that it needs for
24 its investigations, or to request that parties cooperate with the
25 investigation. Statements made to the DSB may not be used as
26 evidence in legal processes. With this provision, the legislator
27 aims to encourage the persons involved to provide full disclosure,
28 since they do not have to fear (criminal) legal percussions" (DSB,
29 October 2075:74-75). ln the international context of the MH17
30 investigation, these rules of conduct were not self-evident (cf. Van
3t Asselt, 2018). The Netherlands had also taken up the responsi-
32 bility for leading (through the Dutch Public Prosecution.Service)
33 the international criminal investigation by the Joint lnvestigation
34 Team. The DSB often works side by side with the Dutch Public
35 Prosecution Office domestically. For the MH17 investigations,
36 they agreed to elaborate the existing protocol in place to align
37 their investigating activities. ln this protocol, they agreed to each
38 proactively share information the other organization might need
39 for its investigation as long as sharing this was not detrimental to
40 its own investigation (DSB, 2015:63).
4L lt was clear that the MH17 occident investigation could only take
42 place when the independence aqd bias-free nature of the investiga-
43 tion would be respected, Otherwise, the results of the investigation
44 would probably not be accepted by the parties involved. Meanwhile,
45 the call for crirninal prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators
46 became louder in the domestic media and among national authori-
47 ties. Already on the day after the crash, Deutsche Welle reported that
48 the investigative journalism collective Bellingcat had found indica-
49 tions of the plane being shot down with a surface-to-air missile (DW,
50 July 18, 2014). Questions on guilt and prosecution were publicly put
51 squarely on the table from day 1. This demonstrated the importance
52 of continuous attention on the differences between both investi-
53 gations, on information exchange between accident investigation
and prosecution, on deciding which pieces of information could be
shared and which information should be kept for the accident inves-
tigation only.
Coordination of an international investigation including part-
ners from different countries is completely different from the
coordinative activities that DSB performs in a domestic acci-
dent investigation. ln the case of MH1Z the team consisted of
the Netherlands, Ukraine, Malaysia, the UK, the United States,
Australia, and the Russian Federation (DSB, 20,15:15). Such partic-
ipating investigators may have different mandates and there is no
hierarchy in place to rule the network. Ukraine had soon afterthe
crash requested the DSB to lead in the lnvestigation, which also
may have been influenced by the fact'that the Ukrainian investi-
gators had only two months earlier made a bilateral working visit
to the Netherlands to exchange best practices. The Dutch Safety
Board has a special concentration of investigative authority in one
single body and a strong national legal mandate that equipped
it-and perhaps legitimized it to others-for complex and sizeable
investigations.
A practical way to deal with tension between national interests
in the context of an investigation is the so-called party system with
accredited representatives of each nation involved in an investiga-
tion, a common practice in international air crash investigations. The
inclusion of the Russian Federation in this party system which meant
that they had to go along in creating the consensus that was needed
in each step of the investigation. Some steps of this party-system
approach were followed explicitly during the MH17 investigation as
well, for example various international meetings when a new phase
of the investigation was reached and consensus had to be reached
about the conclusions thus far.
4.3 | Communication with the world
The crucial importance of uniformity of communication stood in
stark contrast to the challenges that the DSB faced in commu-
nicating about the MH17 investigation. As the MH17 crash was
part of a larger conflict between a number of parties in Ukraine,
multiple accounts of what happened existed and regular war prop-
aganda played an important role in the worldwide communica-
tion flow about the incident. The DSB had to weigh every piece
of information that became available extremely carefully on its
trustworthiness, source, and importance to the investigation. This
was not only the case in the early phases of the analysis, when
data were collected, but also in later stages, when local sources
for instance denied that the BUK weapon system was proliferated
in the region.
Meanwhile, the chairman of the Dutch Safety Board demanded
a limited time span for the investigation, announcing the publication
deadline of 13 October 2015, early on. A firm conviction that time-
liness was also part of the quality of the investigation, that relatives
of the passengers were entitled to the soonest possible conclusions,
and that during the investigation, the DSB would be the only voice






















































that could communicate authoritatively about the case, contributed
to this tight schedule.
The relatives of victims played an important role in the consid-
erations of the DSB throughout the investigation process. When
the DSB reported on its findings, it not only published a report to
account for the investigation process, but also a special book writ-
ten by journalist in accessible language on the investigation and its
findings. Relatives of victims were also informed prior to public an-
nouncements and press statements. The central position of victims
and relatives in investigations is a relatively new trend that stands in
stark contrast with the information position of the affected in previ-
ous decades (Jong & D0ckers, 2019).
The communication approach of the investigation to conflict-
ing views was an inclusive one. ln the early phases of the inves-
tigation, an international social media analysis commissioned to
a third party resulted in a list of wide-ranging hypotheses that
were all systematically considered in the investigation process.
The aircraft was meticulously reconstructed from the debris and
the parts that could be recovered.2 This is an arduous process
but it proved crucial in showing and communicating the findings
of the investigation to stakeholders, victim's relatives, and the
public at large. The evidence was there, for the whole world to
see. Several meetings with the accredited representatives of the
nations involved in the accident investigation ensured that these
national authorities could voice potential disagreement and alter-
native views within the confines of the investigative process. Each
meeting was concluded with the results of the investigation so far.
Deviating views were noted and responded to in the report. ln the
end, less far-reaching joint conclusions that included all partners
on the findings were also formulated. When the final investigation
findings were presented, most alternative accounts had already
been discredited along the way.
Not only multiple realities co-existed, also new sources gained
prominence in influencing public perception. The MH17 investiga-
tion was probably the first in which private investigation initiatives
such as the Bellingcat collective played such a vislble role. Due to the
large amount of information that such research groups were able to
discover and because of the public access to their efforts, the com-
munis opinio quickly focused on one scenario in particular' The DSB
realized it should be constantly aware of the possible influence this
may have on investigators and to be alert on confirmation bias and
other effects on the objectivity of the investigation. The DSB also
had to account constantly for the long duration and arduous nature
of its investigation, towards an audience that seemed to have made
up its mind long time before. With a "power shift to the previously
uninformed," a new set of actors had to be taken into account (Cf.
Florini & Dehqanzada, 7999:46).
To convey a stroRg unambiguous message about the findings
and conclusions of the investigation, the reconstructed aircraft
formed the background of the press conference in which the
chairman of the DSB presented the findings of the investigation.
The pattern of holes in the plane was there for the whole world
to see. The precise account of the facts found in the investigation
matched the visible evidence in the background. The visualization
of evidence may have contributed to overcoming transboundary
communication challenges that otherwise relate to language and
contradictory sources.
5 | CONCLUSIONS: TRANSBOUNDARY
ACCI DENT I NVESTIGATIO NS
ln sum, this case yields many important lessons regarding interna-
tional accident investigation in response to transboundary crises.
First, uncertainty reduction required diplomacy at the highest lev-
els of international governance, the legitimacy of the investigation
benefitted from clear pre-exlsting procedures and strong mandates,
and external reviews were deliberately invited as part of the inves-
tigation. However, this does not alter the fact that within these in-
vestigations uncertainty will remain a key issue. Even if facilitated
by high-end diplomacy,,clear procedures and external reviews, in-
vestigations in a transboundary context will require constant im-
provisation. Otizen journalism and investigation efforts proved to
be informative to many in terms of uncertainty reduction but also
a serious challenge to formal investigators. Finally, the DSB aimed
to reduco public uncertainty and to find answers for the relatives of
the victims by establishing a firm deadline early on. This is a form of
uncertainty reduction for others that is invaluable, but it increased
stress on the investigators.
Second, the coordination challenges that arose in terms of pro-
Viding organizational capacity and cooperating at multiple levels
of governance were manifold. The size and scope of the investi-
gation demanded an unparalleled effort on the part of the DSB,
and unprecedented cooperation with and reliance on external
partners and sources. For instance, investigating in a war zone
implied that much of the initial evidence relied heavily on digital
photography from those who reached the scene when it was still
accessible. lnitial reliance on photographs taken by forensic teams
at the crash site-because the site was later on also temporarily in-
accessible and could not be sealed off-was new for investigators
and proved how invaluable the first documentation was. The par-
allel investigation by the prosecution team made strict agreements
on independence and information sharing imperative. The party
system of accredited representatives played an important role in
creating international consensus during the investigation process'
All three observations indicate the importance of building trust in
an international network from the very start of the investigation,
and the implications of sound processes of information sharing
and decision-making and carefully crafted agreements between
partners from different functional and geographic jurisdictions.
lnvestigative authority, in spite of the international agreements in
civil aviation, cannot be seen as a given but needs to be constantly
established and earned, in the process. More could be learned
from research on organizational reputation of regulators and
authorities, also for coordination in crises situations (Carpenter,
2010; Busuioc,2}76). ld/!























































Third, communication in terms of meaning making and pro-
viding an authoritative account of the causes and lessons of the
MH17 disaster proved to be a compound challenge. The investiga-
tors included all competing hypotheses in their research, meeting
Elliott and McGuiness (2OO2:27) plea for a broadening of scope
of investigations as "in matters of public importance, all relevant
evidence should be considered." The inclusive approach served a
communication purpose as well; considering all possible explana-
tions for the crash exhaustively and transparently, the investiga-
tion firmly established its conclusions and presented them to the
world. The DSB further showed awareness of potential public dis-
trust by offering transparency on the investigation process in the
form of a special report. The investigators also reached out to the
relatives of victims, in order to include them prominently in their
communication efforts, as evidenced by their special publication
in accessible language on the investigation process and findings
(Smilde, 2015).
We argue that these lessons transcend the boundaries of this
individual case. With the increase of international civil aviation of
the past decades, the increase of extreme weather and climate
change-related disasters, and the interconnectedness of critical in-
frastructures and common markets, transboundary crises are likely
to be on the rise. Lessons on transboundary accident investigations
are no luxury. Accident investigators should prepare for intense
multi-level, multi-sectoral cooperation in line with the challenges
and coping efforts outlined above. Transboundary lessons may
prove invaluable for learning from future accidents.
EN DNOTES
lvisit the website of one of the Dutch national tv news media,
for the press statement of July 18, 2OI4, at https://nos.nl/video/
67 657 8- persconf erentie-premi er-rutte-en-mi nister-timmermans-
over-vlucht-mh17-16-OO-uur.html (retrieved on 10 October 2018).
2Thir ir done only in rare occasions, and such a reconstruction had
never before occurred in the Netherlands. Thb DSB studied two fa-
mous prior reconstructions: the TWA flight,800 in the United States
and the Pan Am flight 103 in Scotland in orderto learn from previous
experience.
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